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Abstract. In PPP projects, insufficient risk management may lead to the breakdown of partnerships and even project fail-
ures. Among them, the government credit risk is regarded as unbearable risk and a key risk affecting PPP projects because 
of its high frequency and impact. Therefore, based on the contractual relationship between both sides, a principal-agent 
model for the optimal choice of investors and the government under the government default probability is constructed. 
This paper explored the quantity relationship of the government credit risk and the project utility through analysing the 
effect of government default probability perceived by both parties on the investor’s optimal effort level and government 
allocation ratio. The results demonstrate that the government credit risk will decrease the effort level of investors and have 
a negative impact on the utility of the project. Furthermore, the government’s modification of the contract allocation ratio 
based on its own credit rating can offset the negative impact of its credit risk on the effectiveness of the project. But this 
regulatory effect is limited. The findings effectively provide some insights and theoretical basis for solving the negative ef-
fects of government credit risk.
Keywords: PPP project, government credit risk, project utility, game theory, operation stage.
Introduction
Public infrastructure is generally considered low efficiency 
in construction and operation, wasting natural and finan-
cial resources. Public infrastructure construction and op-
erating costs are hard to make up for by revenue, result-
ing in government financial burden (Ehrhardt & Janson, 
2010). In this scenario, Public private partnership (PPP) 
model is widely used in the field of public infrastructure 
(Song et al., 2018; Regan et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2010). 
Because it not only can solve the financial pressure of 
government infrastructure by using social capital (Zhang, 
2005; Yuan et al., 2010), but also can improve operational 
efficiency by introducing social management experience 
(Cheng et  al., 2016; Zhang et  al., 2016). However, PPP 
large-scale infrastructure projects are embedded with 
many features, such as huge scales, long cycles and great 
uncertainty. Therefore, PPP projects may face many risks, 
such as government credit risks, construction risks, mar-
ket risks and operational risks (Bing et al., 2005). Among 
them, the government credit risk is regarded as unbeara-
ble risk and a key risk affecting PPP projects because of its 
high frequency and impact (Keers & van Fenema, 2018).
In the preparation of PPP projects, the government 
usually promises investors high returns and guarantees to 
ensures project viability and participation of the investors 
in a turbulent investment environment (Chen, 2009; Ke 
et al., 2010), such as high return of fixed investment, tax 
incentives, long concession contract, etc. However, during 
the operation, the government may not follow the promise 
due to changes in the internal and external environment. 
Then it leads to the government credit risk and often oc-
curs in real cases. For example, in the PPP project of Delhi 
Airport Express Line, the government refused to provide 
assistant as promised when the project fallen in trouble. 
And investors used incomplete contracts to claim com-
pensation from government. The cooperation relationship 
broke down eventually (Gao et al., 2017). In the PPP pro-
ject of Citong Bridge in China, the government promised 
the guarantee of restrictive competition to project com-
pany. But a few years later two new bridges were built 
nearby and competed with the Citong Bridge, which made 
it impossible for the project company to recover the cost 
(Song et al., 2009). There are many uncertainties caused by 
the turbulence in the internal and external environment 
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will impact the behavior of the government default. When 
the external environment or policy of the project changes, 
the government is more inclined to default to get inflows 
to ease debt or fiscal pressure.
The government credit reflects the possibility of the 
government default based on the government’s fiscal ca-
pacity and the history of the government default (Levy & 
Pauzner, 2014). Low government credit indicates greater 
government credit risk. And then the occurrence of gov-
ernment credit risk will further reduce government credit. 
The higher probability of default will result in more losses 
to investors. This will lead to high prices, high financ-
ing costs, and opportunistic behavior of investors in PPP 
projects, and then leading to the reduction of the project 
utility and social welfare. Government credit risk has seri-
ously restricted the progress of PPP projects and hindered 
the sustainable development of PPP model (Ryan, 2007).
Therefore, it is necessary to reveal the internal trans-
mission mechanism of government credit risk and open 
the “black box” of government credit impact on project 
(Kadefors, 2004). Given the relationship forged by govern-
ments (as a principal) and private investors (as an agent), 
models are constructed to design the optimal contract ar-
rangements in the government credit risk scenarios using 
principal-agent theory to explore the quantity relationship 
of the government credit risk and the project utility.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviewed 
the literatures on the root causes and impact of the gov-
ernment credit risk. Section 2 established and calculated 
the game model. And then section 3 analyzed and dis-
cussion the impact of the government credit risk to the 
project. A numerical simulation is performed in section 
4 to briefly illustrate and demonstrate the analysis of this 
article. Last section put forward suggestions according to 
the analysis results.
1. Literature review
PPP projects always face critical risks because there are 
many uncertainties in long concession period (Bing 
et  al., 2005). Insufficient risk management may lead to 
the breakdown of partnerships (Uiterwijk et  al., 2013) 
and even project failures (Soomro & Zhang, 2016). In 
the preparation of PPP projects, the government usually 
promises investors high returns and guarantees to attract 
investors to participate in PPP projects (Chen, 2009; Ke 
et al., 2010). However, too many guarantees provided by 
the government would decrease social welfare, increase 
project financing costs and the government fiscal pressure, 
finally induce government credit risks (Wibowo et  al., 
2012). More than this, some governments made unreal-
istic guarantees to investors and even disguised some un-
suitable construction projects as PPP projects to improve 
their administrative performance (Wang et  al., 2000). 
These projects tend to have low profits, poor returns and 
unable to cover costs, which increases the possibility of 
government credit default (Sachs et  al., 2007). In addi-
tion, although some governments choose PPP projects to 
improve operational efficiency, innovative technology and 
management skills, others choose PPPs because of fiscal 
deficits, budget pressures, and supply and demand gaps 
(Chowdhury et al., 2011). The government budget deficit 
and subsidy overrun will also produce the hidden danger 
of credit default (Iossa & Martimort, 2015). In Indonesia, 
the political risk perception for PPP projects is relatively 
high due to exist of the country’s legal and regulatory risk 
and government breach of contract (Voelker et al., 2008). 
In China, the risks related the government account for 
three of the top four in risk rankings according the two-
round Delphi survey with practitioners (Ke et al., 2011). 
In Singapore, which is widely regarded as politically sta-
ble, unstable government behavior is seen as the fifth most 
critical risk factor in adopting PPP projects given a long 
concession period (Hwang et al., 2013). The credit default 
of local public sectors has become a formidable force to 
cause termination in several cases (Yang et al., 2019). And 
government credit risk has seriously restricted the pro-
gress of PPP projects and hindered the sustainable devel-
opment of PPP model (Ryan, 2007). Therefore, the credit 
risk is regarded as a key risk and needed to manage care-
fully (Keers & van Fenema, 2018).
In terms of managing credit risk, it is important to es-
tablish a complete credit system (Marques & Berg, 2012). 
The credit rating reflects the probability of default on the 
government (Levy & Pauzner, 2014) because it contains a 
comprehensive evaluation of the government’s ability to 
perform (objective facts) and willingness to perform (sub-
jective ideas). Therefore, the credit rating can help inves-
tors to distinguish the government credit information to 
avoid the tale of Gresham’s law. And many scholars have 
conducted a profound study on the estimation of default 
probability and credit risk. Grammenos et al. (2008) pro-
posed a binary logit model to predict the probability of 
default for high yield bond issued by shipping companies. 
Tserng et al. (2012) predicts contractor default by employ-
ing three option-based credit models (BSM, CB, and BS) 
based on stock market information. In PPP projects, Kong 
et  al. (2008) used a conditional credit rating transition 
matrix to predict default probability in project finance. Li 
et al. (2017) presented a structural model and calibrated 
using market data to estimate the default probability of 
a project company in a PPP project. Wang et  al. (2019) 
proposed a quantitative analysis method to estimate the 
project credit risk under a certain confident level based 
on Credit Metrics model and Monte Carlo simulation 
technique. The government credit rating system is be-
coming more and more comprehensive and accurate with 
the calculation of various probability of default (Tserng 
et  al., 2011, 2012). However, due to the features of PPP 
projects, some projects are monopolistic and expected to 
have high profit. Investors may cooperate with low-credit 
governments to obtain high returns. In this scenario, it 
still cannot completely prevent low-credit governments 
from entering the market through establishing a thorough 
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credit rating system. Therefore, it is necessary to reveal the 
internal transmission mechanism of government credit 
risk and open the “black box” of government credit im-
pacts on project in public-private partnership.
Credit ratings reflect investors’ perception of the prob-
ability of a government default and government credit 
risk. Investors can choose different strategy according to 
the perception of the probability of a government default. 
Some researchers have studied bank loan under PPP pro-
ject finance, and it was found that credit risks critically 
impacted on loan spreads (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2010; 
Girardone & Snaith, 2011) because the low credit rating 
prevents project from raising funds with low capital costs. 
In addition, a higher probability of default will cause in-
vestors to reduce the proportion of capital and increase 
the proportion of debt, which will lead to higher financing 
costs (Li et al., 2017). Worse still, in the preparation stage 
of PPP projects, a higher probability of default will cause 
investors to have more expected losses. This will result in 
more requirements and higher prices for investors when 
bidding (Lara-Rubio et al., 2017). In summary, low credit 
rating has resulted in unfavorable loan terms and weak 
negotiation power that significantly affect the bankability 
and value for money of PPP projects. However, the above 
scholars only studied the impact of government credit risk 
on the project from the perspective of financial feasibility. 
There are few studies to discuss the impact of government 
credit risk on the project during the operation stage. And 
these studies did not consider the impact of the endog-
enous behaviors of the investors aiming at maximizing the 
profits on the project. In the project operation stage, given 
the principal-agent relationship between investors and the 
government in PPP projects, high credit risk may lead to 
the opportunistic behavior of investors, such as reducing 
the level of effort and the cost of investment, leading to 
the reduction of the quality of the project products or ser-
vices. Therefore, this paper tries to explore the quantitative 
impact of government credit risk on the project utility and 
design the optimal contract arrangements in the govern-
ment credit risk scenarios using game theory.
2. Model assumptions and calculations
2.1. Model assumptions
In PPP projects, the government and investors make stra-
tegic choices according to the utility that can measure 
costs and benefits. The utility theory is used to evaluate 
the project feasibility from both financial and nonfinan-
cial aspects before the implementation (Yan et al., 2011), 
identify and assess the potential risks faced by investors 
(Kang & Feng, 2009), determine a reasonable project ceil-
ing price (Wang, 2002). It is widely used in PPP project 
research because it can analyze various behavior choices 
and decision-making problems caused by uncertainty. 
Therefore, according to the utility theory, game models of 
investors and government credit under the condition of 
excess revenue during the operation period of PPP project 
are established. From the results of the model, the change 
of investors’ effort level and the impact on the project util-
ity are analyzed, and the role path of government credit 
on the value promotion of PPP project is studied. And 
the next step is to make some practical basic assumptions 
before establishing the model.
Assumption 1. The government and investors are ra-
tional. And their risk preference is neutral. In addition, 
consider a new PPP project that has no other competitive 
projects nearby. The investors determine the project qual-
ity to maximize their expected profit (Feng et al., 2015). 
The project quality is determined by the investor’s effort. 
Effort refers to a series of activities to improve the quality 
or quantity of the project’s products or services. The varia-
ble that measures effort is called the level of effort (Taylor, 
2002; Krishnan et al., 2004). The higher level of effort by 
investors not only means an increase in operational invest-
ment, but also an increase in the level of soft power such 
as innovative operations. Let us denote the investor’s ef-
fort level in the operation period of PPP project by e. The 
investors with the high effort level will improve the quality 
and quantity PPP project products or public services.
Assumption 2. According to Kopalle and Winer 
(1996), the quality of the product can stimulate market de-
mands. In PPP project, the projects demand is the amount 
of public use for the project, such as traffic flow, water 
consumption, etc. The projects demand increases with 
the improvement of quality. Considering the influence of 
price and effort level on demand, the demand function 
is expressed as D(p, qe), where p is the selling price of 
the product or service and qe is the quality of the product 
or service (Feng et al., 2015). In PPP projects, the price 
has been determined by policies, laws and supervisions 
to avoid excessive profits generated by project monopoly 
and harm to public interests. It is usually a fixed value in 
PPP projects for a certain period. The quality of the proj-
ect qe is determined by the level of effort of the investor. 
Therefore, the demand of the project is D(e), D'(e) > 0. 
Considering the influence of price and effort level on de-
mand and according to Tirole (1994), the normal demand 
of the project is expressed as D e= λδ + ξ . In the equation, 
l(l ≥ 0) is the comprehensive adjustment coefficient of 
normal output considering the linear effect of investor ef-
fort level on product service or quality and the linear effect 
of product or service quality on demand. That is, the out-
put efficiency. d (d ≥ 0) is the investment of investors own 
resources or ability endowment. x is a random variable 
with normal distribution with a mean of basic demand of 
PPP project q and a variance of m2, x ~ N(q, m2). PPP as an 
infrastructure generally has a basic demand from public, 
and this basic demand is more than zero.
Assumption 3. In PPP projects operational period, the 
cost of product production or service provision consists 
of fixed cost and variable cost. The operational fixed cost 
is the cost that unrelative with the quantity of the usage, 
such as the salary of the management stuff. The operation-
al variable cost is the cost that relative with the quantity of 
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the usage, such as the fee of the material. Besides, consid-
ering that the effort made by investors in the project will 
lead to a decrease in investor resources and an increase 
in opportunity cost, this cost is regarded as the effort cost 
C(e) of investors. According to the Taylor (2002) and H-M 
theoretical model (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987), the in-
vestor’s effort cost function is ( ) 21
2
C e me= , where m is 
the coefficient of effort cost, m > 0. A higher value of m 
indicates a higher cost for at a specific level of the pro-
ductive efforts. Therefore, the total cost of the project is 
( ) ( ) 21
2f v f v
C C dC C e C C e me= + + = + λδ + ξ + .
Assumption 4. When the project revenue is low, the 
government-controlled utilities bought back by the gov-
ernment are generally inefficient in operation. Tariffs 
seldom cover the full cost of service (Ehrhardt & Janson, 
2010). Instead, it enlarges the pressure of the government 
debt and fiscal pressure. Therefore, only when project rev-
enue is high, the government will default to receive cash 
inflows to ease debt or fiscal pressure. Based on the risk-
sharing rules as well as to protect the public interest, the 
government receives a share of the excess revenue when 
the actual earnings of the investors exceed expected re-
turns (Ashuri et al., 2012). The government stipulates the 
excess revenue sharing boundary R0 and the excess rev-
enue sharing ratio k to the investor (Wang & Liu, 2015). R0 
is based on the investor’s investment cost and reasonable 
profit margin. When the project revenue is below R0, all 
revenue of the project is owned by the investor. When the 
project revenue is higher than R0, the difference between 
project revenue and R0 will be shared by the government 
and investors. The ratio shared by the government and 
investors is k and 1 – k.
Assumption 5. In PPP projects, the government not 
only considers economic benefits, but also considers social 
benefits. According to the previous hypothesis, the qual-
ity of project products or services will affect the public’s 
demand for projects. For the government, the quantifica-
tion of social benefits is simplified as a positive correlation 
with project demand, i.e. ( ) ( ) D e eϕ = ϕ λδ + ξ , ( )0ϕ ϕ ≥  is 
the ratio adjustment coefficient between social benefit and 
demand. On the one hand, the large demand of projects 
can reflect the quality level of projects; On the other hand, 
it can also reflect the coverage of projects to the public, 
that is, the benefit breadth of the public.
Assumption 6. The government credit represents the 
willingness and ability of the government to comply with 
the contract. It is assumed that the government will not 
choose to default out of self-interest because it can make 
massive losses (L) larger than the benefit by defaulting, 
such as decreasing the reputation and political perfor-
mance. But it does not mean that the government will 
never default. There are many uncertainties caused by the 
turbulence in the internal and external environment will 
impact the behavior of the government default. When the 
external environment or policy of the project changes, the 
government is more inclined to default to get inflows to 
ease debt or fiscal pressure. Therefore, it is assumed that 
whether a government defaults is not determined by the 
government but by the internal and external environment. 
The government credit indicates the possibility of the gov-
ernment default based on the government’s fiscal capacity 
and the history of the government default.
The credit rating reflects the probability of default on 
the government’s debt and thus affects its financing costs 
(Levy & Pauzner, 2014). The government has different 
credit levels and it indicates the possibility of the gov-
ernment default based on the government’s fiscal capac-
ity and the history of the government default. From the 
perspective of investors, government credit is fixed and 
determines investors perception of government default 
probability f ( 0 1f≤ ≤ ). Correspondingly, the probability 
that the government will not default is ( )1  0 1 1f f− ≤ − ≤ .
Assumption 7. In PPP project, the government grants 
the project concession to the investors, and the inves-
tors give the products or services of high quality to the 
public. As a special resource provider, the government 
can choose the suitable investors at the beginning of the 
project, but the investors with less resources have no or 
few other options. Valero (2015) proposed that the PPP 
projects may lead a government to behave opportunisti-
cally because government has more resources to dominate 
the partnership through the contract, such as choosing 
to change the contract at any time due to changes in the 
external environment or other reasons. Therefore, inves-
tors may lose faith in the government. It means that the 
investors believe that the government will change the con-
tract during the operation period to extract project ben-
efits. There are many different forms of the government 
default, such as renegotiation of the contract, bailout of 
the private operator or even termination of the contract 
(Vecchi et al., 2017). Compared with other credit default 
behaviors, government buyback and direct termination 
are the most common methods (Yang et al., 2019). There-
fore, the government default behaviors can be explained 
by model that the government buys back the program at 
a price 0,  0,  R R R∈   .
2.2. Model establishment and solution
In the absence of government credit risk, the government, 
as the first party, puts forward the boundary and propor-
tion of excess revenue distribution. Investors choose to 
accept or reject according to the conditions given by the 
government. If investors choose to reject the conditions, 
the game ends. Investors will quit the PPP project and 
the government chooses new investors again. If investors 
choose to accept the conditions, in the project operation 
phase, they will choose the best level of effort to maximize 
their own interests according to the conditions given by 
the government. However, government defaults occur af-
ter investors choose the level of effort. Under the assump-
tion of government default, the real order of the game 
should be that investors first choose the optimal level of 
effort, and then the government default. The game order is 
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changed. Therefore, this paper turns this uncertainty into 
a choice under risk. Therefore, this game model intro-
duced “nature” to express the uncertainty of government 
credit risk. And the rule of natural selection is consistent 
with the corresponding default probability under the gov-
ernment credit rating.
Most cases of the government default, government will 
pay the repurchase price based on the investors reasonable 
profit. Simultaneously, the government-controlled utilities 
are generally inefficient in operation. Tariffs seldom cover 
the full cost of service (Ehrhardt & Janson, 2010). When 
the project revenue is low, government will not buyback 
project in general because the difference between revenue 
and cost needs to be paid by the government, which will 
increase the pressure of the government debt and fiscal. 
When the project revenue is high, government buyback 
projects will obtain all the profits of projects and it will 
relieve the government debt or fiscal pressure. Therefore, 
in order to analyze the impact of government credit on 
the utility of the project during the operation, this paper 
start with PPP projects with high expected revenue, that 
is ( ) ( )2 0
1
2f v
C C e me R p e+ λδ + ξ + < < λδ + ξ .
Based on the above analysis and assumptions, when 
government doesn’t default, the revenue of investors is 
( ) ( ) ( ) 21 0 0
11 .
2I f v
p e R k R C C e me π = λδ + ξ − − + − − λδ + ξ −   




R C C e meπ = − − λδ + ξ − . In the trading re-
lationship, traders will choose different trading meth-
ods according to the credit status of the trading object. 
Therefore, investors have two choices. Investors choose 
to trust government that it can comply with the project 
contract. Another option for investors is to choose not 
to trust the government. Considering the probability of 
government default of PPP projects, the comprehen-
sive net income of investors Iπ  can be expressed as: 
( ) 1 21I I If fπ = − π + π . Therefore, the expected net in-
come of investors with the government default risks is 
( ) 1 2( ) 1I I IE E f f π = − π + π  .
( )







p e q R k R C C e q me
π = −
  λδ + − − + − − λδ + − +   
( ) 21 .
2f v
f R C C e q me − − λδ + − 
   
(1)
Similarly, for governments, assume the income is 
pG1 when government doesn’t default; Conversely, the 
income is pG2 when the government default. Accord-
ing to the former analysis in PPP project, pG1 and pG2, 
respectively, are: ( ) ( )1 0G p e R k e π = λδ + ξ − + ϕ λδ + ξ  ; 
( ) ( )2G p e e R Lπ = λδ + ξ + ϕ λδ + ξ − − . Considering the 
probability of government default of PPP projects, the com-
prehensive net income of government pG can be expressed 
as: ( ) 1 21G G Gf fπ = − π + π . Therefore, the expected net 
income of governments is ( ) 1 2( ) 1G G GE E f f π = − π + π  .
( ) ( ) ( )0( ) 1 { }GE f p e q R k e q π = − λδ + − + ϕ λδ + + 
( ) ( ){ }f p e q e q L Rλδ + + ϕ λδ + − − . (2)
Because both investors and governments assume risk 
neutrality, in this scenario, the expected utility is equal to 
the expected net income, i.e. ( )I IU E= π , ( )G GU E= π . 
Therefore, the investors and government strategy choice 
can be obtained by calculating the model of dynamic 
game. Equation s.t. UI is the set of constraints that en-
sures investor’s participation in the project (participation 
constraint), and equation max Ie
U  represents the motiva-
tion for investors to maximize their interests (incentive 
compatibility constraint).
( ) ( ) ( )0max 1 { }Gk U f p e q R k e q = − λδ + − + ϕ λδ + + 
( ) ( ){ }f p e q e q L Rλδ + + ϕ λδ + − − ; (3)
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 20 0





s t U f
p e q R k R C C e q me
= −
  λδ + − − + − − λδ + − +   
( ) 21 0
2f v














p e q R k R C C e q me
= −
  λδ + − − + − − λδ + − +   
( ) 21
2f v





The game is solved by inverse induction. * max IU
τ
τ ∈  
represents the optimal effort level of investors according 
to the Nash equilibrium. To get the optimal solution of 
e, it is necessary to find the first derivative of the revenue 
function and make it equal to zero. The reaction func-
tion e* is obtained. And then, the government sets the 
distribution of revenue k in consideration of the choice 
of the investors optimal level of effort. The same method 
is used to get the optimal value. According to the first-
order equivalent conditions of max Gk
U , max Ie
U  and s.t. 
UI, the optimal effort level and optimal proportion of the 
revenue allocation to investors, respectively, are:
( )( )*
*
1 1 vf k p C
e
m










vpqm R m p p c pfk
p f






3. Model analysis and discussion
1. According the participation constraint s.t. UI, the maxi-
mum of the government default probability fPC that the in-
vestors will participate in the PPP project can be obtained: 
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( ) ( ) ( )









p e q R k R C C e q me
f
p e q R k R R
 λδ + − − + − − λδ + − 
≤
 λδ + − − + − 
.
In other words, investors will participate in the PPP pro-
ject only when the expected default probability of the 
government represented by the governments credit rating 
satisfies the participation constraint. Otherwise, investors 
will not participate in the PPP project.
When ( ) 21
2f v
R C C e q me≥ + λδ + + , then 1PCf ≤ . 
( ) 21 
2f v
R C C e q me≥ + λδ + +  represents that the price 
of the government buyback is larger than the total cost of 
the operation. The investor can profit from participating 
in PPP projects even if the government default. In this 
scenario, investors participation in PPP projects is not 
determined by the governments credit rating, but by the 
project’s costs and benefits.
When ( ) 21
2f v
R C C e q me< + λδ + + , then
 
( ) ( ) ( )









p e q R k R C C e q me
f
p e q R k R R
 λδ + − − + − − λδ + − 
≤
 λδ + − − + − 
. 
Investors will participate in the PPP project only when the 
expected default probability of the government is lower 
than fPC. Conversely, if f > fPC, then the investor will not 
choose to participate in PPP projects. In this scenario, 
investors participation in PPP projects is determined 
by the governments credit rating and influenced by the 
project’s costs and benefits. ( ) ( )0 01p e q R k R λδ + − − +   
represents the total revenue of the investors. And 
( ) 21
2f v
C C e q me+ λδ + +  represents the total costs of 
the investors. fPC is directly proportional to the total rev-
enue of investors and inversely proportional to the total 
cost of investors. That is, the higher the expected revenue 
of the project, the looser the probability of government 
default under the restriction of investor participation. The 
lower the requirement for government credit rating is for 
investors to choose to participate in PPP projects. When 
the total project cost is higher, the probability of govern-
ment default is stricter. The higher the requirement for 
government credit rating is for investors to choose to par-
ticipate in PPP projects.
In PPP practice, investors generally have multiple 
projects involved. When the expected return of a pro-
ject is not optimistic, investors will choose to focus on 
other projects and maintain the project with the lowest 
effort cost. Therefore, there are the minimal of the effort 
level e = 0. According the optimal level of the investors 
effort 
( )( )* 1 1 vf k p Ce
m
 λδ − − − = , when e*  = 0, then 
the maximum of the government default probability fIC 












. ( ) ve q cλδ +  represents 
the variable cost of the project, and ( )( )1p e q kλδ + −  
represents the variable revenue shared by the inves-
tors in the excess revenue of the project. Therefore, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
v vC e q C
k p e q k p
λδ +
=
− λδ + −
 represents the cost ratio of 
the investors. Higher cost ratio indicate less profit for the 
investors. When the investors cost ratio is higher, fIC is 
smaller and the condition of f < fIC is stricter. The cost 
ratio of investors is positively correlated with the propor-
tion of government participation in the allocation k. The 
greater the proportion of government participation in the 
allocation, the more stringent the probability of govern-
ment default is for investors to choose to make efforts.
In summary, the maximum of the government default 
probability ( ), max IC PCf min f f=  that the investors will 
participate and put in the effort in PPP project can be ob-
tained. When maxf f≤ , investor will choose the different 
effort level based on the different of the government credit 
rating. In addition to this, when IC PCf f f≤ ≤ , the in-
vestors will participate in the PPP project but operate the 
project with zero effort level and input. In this scenario, 
the introduction of private investors into project will not 
improve the project efficiency and cannot realize the value 
of PPP project. When PCf f≤ , investors will refuse to 
participate in PPP projects.
2. The projects utility is the sum of total revenue 
and total costs in PPP project. The total revenue of 
the projects is ( )( )p e q+ ϕ λδ + . And the total costs 
of the projects are ( ) 21
2f v
C C e q me fL+ λδ + + + . 
The project utility represents the efficiency of the proj-
ect. Therefore, the projects utility UP is denoted: 
( )( ) 21
2P v f
U p C e q C me fL= + ϕ− λδ + − − − . From the 
above equation, it can be seen that the probability of gov-
ernment default directly affects the total cost, thus damag-
ing the total utility of the project.
The effort level (ep) that satisfies the maximization of 
the total utility of the project can be obtained by taking the 
first reciprocal of the effort level of the project utility equa-




λδ + ϕ−  = . 
When pe e≤ , there is a positive correlation between the 
total project benefit and the investor’s effort level. When 
pe e> , there is a negative correlation between the total 
project benefit and the investor’s effort level. It can be 
obtained from the equation of investors optimal effort 
level (
( )( )* 1 1 vf k p Ce
m
 λδ − − − = ) that the choice of 
investors effort level is positively correlated with the per-
ceived probability of government default. Meanwhile, it 
is obviously that * pe e< . Therefore, when government 
credit causes the level of investor effort to decline, it also 
reduces the effectiveness of the project. Government credit 
risk not only increases the cost of the total utility of the 
project, but also reduces the total output of the project by 
reducing the level of investor efforts.
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p f
− + λ δ − −ϕ−
=
λ δ −
) into the 
investor’s effort level equation, the optimal effort lev-
el of investors is 
( )( ) ( )* 2 2 0* 1 1
2
v v
f k p C p p C pqm R m
e
m pm
 λδ − − − λ δ − + ϕ − + = =
λδ ( )( ) ( )* 2 2 0* 1 1
2
v v
f k p C p p C pqm R m
e
m pm
 λδ − − − λ δ − + ϕ − + = =
λδ
. It can be seen from the 
expression of e* that the level of investors best effort has 
nothing to do with the probability of government default. 
In other words, under the contract arrangement of opti-
mal allocation ratio, the choice of investors optimal effort 
level is not affected by the government credit risk. Fur-
thermore, the output of project utility cannot be affected.
3. When there is no government credit risk (f = 0), the 
investors optimal effort level is 
( )0
0
1 vk p Ce
m
 λδ − − = . 
And the government optimal excess revenue sharing ratio is 
( )2 20
0 2 2 2
. 
2
vpqm R m p p ck
p
− + λ δ − −ϕ
=
λ δ
Therefore, the utility of 
the projects is ( )
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. And when  0 < f < fIC, the 
investors will choose the optimal effort level *e  based 
on the government credit. Then ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
*
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The utility loss of the project caused by the government 
credit risk can be deduced: *0P P PU U U∆ = − .
When the value of k  does not sat-
isfy the optimal value k* and is a constant,
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2 1
 
2P
pf k kp fp k
U fL
m
 λ δ − ϕ+ + − ∆ = + . When 
the value of k does satisfy the optimal value k*, PU fL∆ = . 
The utility loss of the project has nothing to do with the 
choice of investors because the government adjust the 
excess revenue distribution when the government credit 
rating is different to maintain the optimal level of investor 
effort unchanged. Therefore, in the PPP project contract 
arrangement, the government distribution ratio should be 
equal to k* as much as possible. This not only maximizes 
the utility of the government, but also protects the utility 
of the project to some extent.
4. Since k represents the proportion of the benefits of 
government and investors, the range of k  is 0,1k∈   . When 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 20 2 2 1vpqm R m p p c pf p f− + λ δ − −ϕ− ≤ λ δ −  









vpqm R m p p c pfk
p f
− + λ δ − −ϕ−
= ∈  λ δ −
.
Conversely, if the parameters satisfy the condition 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 20 2 2 1vpqm R m p p c pf p f− + λ δ − −ϕ− > λ δ − , 
then k* > 1, which is not adapted in actual. In this scenario, 
the optimal value of the qualified excess return distribu-
tion ratio is k* = 1. That is, at the beginning of the project, 
the government and the investors reach an agreement that 
the government enjoys all the excess return of the project. 
The investors will operate the project with zero effort level 





= =  (k* = 0 because the investor’s 
effort level cannot be negative). If the parameters satisfy 
the condition ( )2 20 2 0vpqm R m p p c pf− + λ δ − −ϕ− ≤ , 
then k* ≤ 0. In this scenario, the government will have 
no way to adjust k to keep the optimal level of investor’s 
efforts in the case of government credit risk. At this time, 
the government’s optimal allocation ratio has lost its abil-
ity to control. The government needs to find other ways 
to compensate for the loss of utility caused by insufficient 
credit, such as credit enhancement tools.
Furthermore, the equation of optimal govern-
ment allocation ( )k f  finds the first derivative of f. 
And it’s positive and negative relationships are com-




22 2 22 1
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( )2 20 0vpqm R m p p c− −λ δ + + ϕ > , ( ) k f  is proportional to f. 
Conversely, when ( )2 20 0vpqm R m p p c− −λ δ + + ϕ ≤ , k( f ) 
is inversely proportional to f. Since k represents the propor-
tion of the benefits of government and investors, the range of 
k is k ∈ [0,1] . There is a relationship that has to be satisfied: 
( ) ( )2 2 2 20 2 2 1vpqm R m p p c pf p f− + λ δ − −ϕ− ≤ λ δ − . 
Therefore, k( f ) is inversely proportional to f. This is not 
difficult to understand through the above analysis. It dem-
onstrates that the government will decrease the excess rev-
enue distribution when the government credit rating is 
low to maintain the investors effort level unchanged.
5. The government utility represents the net revenue 
of government in PPP projects. If there is no government 
credit risk (f = 0), the utility of government in PPP pro-
ject is ( ) ( )0 0 0GU p e q R k e q = λδ + − + ϕ λδ +  . When 
0 ICf f< < , the investors will choose the optimal effort 
level e0 to deal with the risk and e0 = e* after consider-
ing the effect of the governments optimal allocation ratio. 
Then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *01 { } { }GU f p e q R k e q f p e q e q L R = − λδ + − + ϕ λδ + + λδ + + ϕ λδ + − − 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *01 { } { }GU f p e q R k e q f p e q e q L R = − λδ + − + ϕ λδ + + λδ + + ϕ λδ + − −  . The utility loss of the 
government caused by the government credit risk can be de-
duced: ( ) ( )* * *0 0 0G G GU U U f L R k k fk R∆ = − = + + − − . 
Since * *0 0k k fk f− − + = , * *0k k fk f− − = − , ∆UG = 
( )0GU f L R R∆ = + − . Under the contract arrangement of op-
timal allocation ratio, the loss of government utility due 
to government credit risk is ( )0f L R R+ − . As assumed 
above, L is large, so the utility loss of the government is a 
positive value. This is positively correlated with the prob-
ability of government default. That is, the higher the prob-
ability of government default, the greater the loss of utility 
of the government.
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In the credit markets, there are many credit en-
hancement’s instruments. Credit enhancements relying 
on third-party agency guarantees to enhance their own 
credit rating are also considered to solve the problem of 
government credit risk in PPP projects (Chowdhury et al., 
2015). Credit enhancement can not only attract investors 
to participate in PPP projects, but also reduce the prob-
ability of government default perceived by both sides. The 
government can use credit enhancement to minimize the 
utility losses by reducing the probability of default. There-
fore, the decision on credit enhancement can be made by 
comparing the price of purchasing credit enhancement in-
struments with the utility loss reduced by the government 
after the credit enhancement.
4. Numerical simulation
When PPP projects are faced with government credit 
risks, investors will reduce the level of effort according to 
the perceived probability of government default, thereby 
damaging the project utility and further damaging the 
government and public interests. An appropriate rev-
enue distribution ratio can help the government to mo-
tivate investors, so as to keep the level of investor effort 
unchanged. And minimize the loss of government credit 
risk to the project. In order to describe the models pro-
posed above more intuitively and further illustrate the 
application of the implications, a numerical simulation is 
furnished in detail.
Given that the probability of the government default 
(f) will directly determine the level of investors effort (e) 
in PPP projects to some extent, then the relationships 
between the optimal allocation proportion (k) and the 
optimal effort level (e) accordingly have been explained 
in different government credit rating , as stated in equa-
tion k* and e*. Assumed that there is a heating PPP pro-
ject. The project is expected to have a construction cost 
of 350 million RMB. The government granted investors 
a 25-year concession period, of which the construction 
period is 3 years. The annual fixed operating cost of the 
project is 2 million RMB (cf = 200). The basic demand 
of the project is 200,000 (q  = 20) and the unit price is 
15 RMB (p = 15). The excess revenue sharing boundary 
is 3.0 million RMB (R0 = 300). Basic parameters of the in-
vestor’s operation project are 1vc = , 2m = , 1.5λ = , 2δ = . 
Basic parameters of the government are 1.2ϕ = , 200L =  
(2 million RMB).
Under the condition that the government’s excess rev-
enue distribution ratio k remains unchanged, the project 
utility is inversely proportional to the probability of gov-
ernment default. In other words, when investors perceive a 
high probability of default due to a low government credit 
rating, they will choose to reduce the level of project effort 
and will lead to a reduction in project utility. This can be 
seen from the horizontal comparison of the data in Ta-
ble 1. Similarly, when the default probability of a project 
is determined, the project utility is inversely proportional 
to the proportion of the government’s excess revenue dis-
tribution. In other words, when the government allocates 
less excess returns from the project, the investors will 
choose to increase the project effort level and lead to the 
improvement of project utility. This can be seen from the 
longitudinal comparison of the data in Table 1.
Therefore, In order to ensure the maximization of its 
own interests and to minimize the loss of project utility 
caused by the government’s credit risk, the government 
can balance the negative utility of the project caused by 
the government’s probability of default by adjusting the 
proportion of excess revenue distribution. As can be seen 
from the column k = k* in Table 1, when the government’s 
excess revenue distribution ratio changes with the default 
probability of the project based on the optimal distribu-
tion ratio formula, the investor’s effort level will not change 
with the default probability of the project. This reduces the 
loss of project utility due to government credit risk.
Table 1. The impact of default probability and revenue distribution on the project
f 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
k = 0.2
e* 16.50 14.70 12.90 11.10 9.30 7.50
Up 584.15 538.23 485.83 426.95 361.59 289.75
UG 231.90 244.14 243.42 229.74 203.10 163.50
k = 0.4
e* 12.00 10.65 9.30 7.95 6.60 5.25
Up 507.20 456.22 401.59 343.32 281.40 215.84
UG 283.20 264.80 239.10 206.12 165.84 118.28
k = 0.6
e* 7.50 6.60 5.70 4.80 3.90 3.00
Up 389.75 341.40 291.43 239.84 186.63 131.80
UG 253.50 219.84 182.94 142.80 99.42 52.80
k = k*
k* 0.43 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.04 –0.15
e* 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40
Up 493.88 473.88 453.88 433.88 413.88 393.88
UG 283.92 265.92 247.92 229.92 211.92 231.54
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If the increase or decrease in the above data is not ob-
vious, this paper illustrates the impact of default prob-
ability and revenue distribution on the project utility 
more clearly by Figure 1. When k = k*, the utility of the 
project is reduced by the loss caused by the probabil-
ity of government default. In this scenario, the absolute 
value of government utility may not be the greatest, but 
the reduction in government utility must be the smallest. 
To some extent, this weakens the impact of government 
credit risk on the project.
It is worth mentioning that the government’s method 
of reducing the impact of credit risk on the project by 
adjusting the allocation ratio is not necessarily effective. 
If k* ≤ 0, the government will have no way to adjust k to 
keep the optimal level of investor’s efforts in the case of 
government credit risk. At this time, the government’s 
optimal allocation ratio has lost its ability to control. 
Therefore, this paper demonstrates the relationship be-
tween the optimal allocation ratio and default prob-
ability by Figure 2.
Under the data assumptions above, when there is no 
government credit risk (f  = 0), the government has the 
largest allocation ratio ( * 0.43maxk = ). Moreover, as the 
probability of government default increases, the govern-
ment’s optimal excess return distribution ratio decreases. 
When f = 0.43, the government has the lowest allocation 
ratio ( * 0mink = ). Therefore, when f > 0.43, the govern-
ment’s optimal allocation ratio has lost its ability to con-
trol. The curve in Figure 2 is the relationship between the 
optimal allocation ratio and default probability. When the 
distribution ratio takes a value on the curve, it not only 
maximizes the utility of the government, but also protects 
the utility of the project to some extent. When the dis-
tribution ratio is taken in the curve, it will increase the 
project utility but decrease the government utility. When 
the distribution ratio is taken outside the curve, it will not 
only reduce the overall utility of the project, but also re-
duce the utility of the government.
When the government’s optimal allocation ratio has 
lost its ability to control, the government can use credit 
enhancement to minimize the utility losses by reduc-
ing the probability of default. Credit enhancement can 
not only enhance government credit to attract investors 
to participate in PPP projects, but also reduce the prob-
ability of government default perceived by both sides. 
The government utility can be increased by reducing the 
probability of government default under the condition of 
keeping the proportion of project revenue distribution un-
changed. This can be used to evaluate whether the credit 
enhancement tool is worth purchasing. When the cost of 
purchasing a credit enhancement tool is greater than the 
increased government utility, it can be purchased. When 
the cost of purchasing a credit enhancement tool is less 
than the increased government utility, it is not worth pur-
chasing. If the government’s original default probability 
was 0.2, its upgrade to 0.0 will increase the utility by 36 
ten-thousands RMB based on Table 1. Then when the cost 
of credit upgrade is greater than 36 ten-thousands RMB, 
the government chooses not to do it. When the cost of 
credit enhancement is less than 36 ten-thousands RMB, 
the government can choose to purchase credit enhance-
ment tools to increase the utility. This provides the basis 
for government decision-making.
Conclusions
There are many risks in PPP projects. Among them, gov-
ernment default has become one of the key risks because 
of its high frequency and large losses. The government’s 
default will lead to the termination of the financial fea-
sibility of the project, resulting in investors not only un-
able to obtain the expected benefits, but also may fail to 
recover the costs paid. This will lead investors to reduce 
operating costs as much as possible and even damage the 
quality of the project, further damaging the social benefit. 
Therefore, it is important for governments and investors 
Figure 1. The impact of default probability and revenue 
distribution on the project utility
Figure 2. The relationship between the optimal allocation ratio 
and default probability
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 25(3): 216–227 225
to understand the causal relationship between govern-
ment credit risk and project utility. Given the relationship 
forged by governments (as a principal) and private inves-
tors (as an agent), models are constructed to design the 
optimal contract arrangements in the government credit 
risk scenarios using principal-agent theory to explore the 
quantity relationship of the government credit risk and 
the project utility.
Results show that the investors will consider the gov-
ernment’s credit risk and choose different strategies to 
maximize their own profits. After comprehensively con-
sidering parameters such as project output and cost, there 
is a maximum government default probability fPC for in-
vestors participating in PPP projects. When the govern-
ment’s probability of default exceeds fPC, investors will 
refuse to participate in PPP projects and hinder the de-
velopment of PPP projects. When the government’s prob-
ability of default is less than fPC, investors will choose to 
participate in the project. However, due to the risk percep-
tion, investor will adjust their level of effort to maximize 
the utility. The greater government credit risk means that 
investors are less likely to get revenue from projects. In 
this scenario, investors will reduce input in the project, 
such as reduce the effort level. This caused a loss of project 
utility eventually.
And then, this paper found that the distribution ratio 
that satisfies the maximization of government utility will 
decrease with the increase of the probability of govern-
ment default within a certain range. The adjustment of 
the distribution ratio has an incentive effect on investors. 
The increase in the level of effort due to incentives exactly 
offsets the reduction of the level of effort by investors to 
deal with credit risks. This means that the government’s 
timely modification of the contract allocation ratio based 
on its own credit rating can offset the negative impact 
of its credit risk on the effectiveness of the project. And 
the role of the government in adjusting the optimal pro-
portional distribution is limited through calculation and 
analysis. In this scenario, government purchase of credit 
enhancement tools can be one solution. And the model’s 
quantitative calculation of government utility can be used 
as a theoretical basis for government decision-making.
Previous studies focused on the impact of credit risk 
on project financing costs and bidding prices in the early 
stage of the project and ignored the impact of credit risk 
on investor behavior during the operation period. Differ-
ent from previous studies, this paper considered the in-
vestors will choose different behavior strategies (the effort 
level) to maximize profits based on the government’s cred-
it rating in operation stage. This study contributes to the 
body of knowledge by quantitatively demonstrating the 
impact of credit risk on project utility during PPP project 
operation and designing the optimal contracts strategy for 
governments. And in view of the problem of limited gov-
ernment contract control capacity, suggestions for credit 
enhancement were put forward. The findings effectively 
provide some new insights for governments and private 
investors considering the government credit risk.
The limitation of this paper is that this paper assumes 
that investors’ perception of the government’s default 
probability depends solely on government credit ratings. 
But in facts this may have more influence factors.
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